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 Wireless near-field (NFC) and 
short-range RFID “security” devices are 
ubiquitous, commonly found in vehicle 
security (keyless-entry, remote-start), 
access control (employee key cards), 
travel cards, point-of-sale (PoS) 
transactions via NFC-enabled mobile 
phone or credit card, among others. 
Whenever assets of high-value are at 
stake, adversaries will stop at nothing 
to gain access to those assets, so it 
should be assumed that security 
systems will be subjected to many 
forms of attack.  There have already 
been several highly publicized 
successful breaches of keyless entry 
systems, including relay and key-
cloning attacks. 
 This poster describes a a highly-
secure, distance-bounding, clone-proof 
RFID mechanism for protecting high-
value assets.  The system employs a 
unique combination of technologies to 
make it highly-resistant to relay attacks, 
probing, modeling, cloning and 
snooping. 
Conclusions 
The RFID system described here 
provides a highly secure platform for 
protecting high-value assets.  The 
system can be used to secure a physical 
system against removal from its intended 
point of operation by confirming its 
location via the distance bounding 
mechanism.  The same mechanism can 
be used to improve keyless entry security 
by ensuring that the key is within a 
predetermined distance of the vehicle 
before allowing it to be opened or driven 
(eliminates relay attacks). 
 
Futher research efforts will be directed 
towards lightweight implementations of 
the hardware mechanisms and 
refinement of the messaging protocols. 
System Overview 
Major Hardware/Firmware Features: 
• PUF+Fuzzy Extractor. Stabilizes 
“noisy” PUF response 
• Lightweight ZKPK (Zero Knowledge 
Proof of Knowledge) protocol limits 
information “leakage” 
• Secure TOF Distance Bounding.  
Time-of-Flight distance measurement 
using secure ZKPK protocol. Token 
derived from PUF. 
• Asymmetric Encryption. Eliminates 
“shared secret” vulnerabilities 
• Power-leveling mitigates any data-
dependent power-consumption 
• Symmetric design to minimize any 
data dependent timing or switching 
“signatures” 
 
TOF Channel Characteristics: 
• Narrow pulse transmissions (e.g., 
impulse radio) 
• Message transmitted as a series of 
quick single-bit transactions 
• Short-highly predictable processing 
time 
• Unpredictable messages 
• Non-repeating protocol 
• Bidirectional, end-to-end security 
Multiple units can be embedded in fixed 
positions (i.e., buried in a building’s 
structure) to permit verification of exact 
location (min. 4 units required to fix 
position in 3-space) 
Physical Unclonable Function 
PUF hidden behind secure hash functions 
and ZKPK protocol to minimize data leakage. 
 
“Fuzzy extractor” stabilizes PUF by providing 
stable output from “noisy” PUF responses.  
Any PUF response “close” to the ‘correct’ 
response (in the Hamming distance sense) 
will provide the correct response value. 
Examples using ECC auxiliary data (e.g., 
Reed-Solomon or BCH): 
Resistance to Attacks 
This system is highly immune to the 
following types of attacks: 
• Relay: Distance limits (using TOF 
distance bounding) cause relay attack to 
fail distance test 
• Probing/Cloning: If PUF is even 
microscopically altered, its responses 
change, effectively destroying it. 
• Modeling: PUF hiding behind ZKPK and 
secure hashes prevent this 
• Snooping: Low-information ZKPK 
techniques and encryption severely 
restrict information available to 
snoopers.    
Secure Distance Bounding 
Generate 
Alt. Check 
Check 
Standalone version requiring no auxiliary 
data, using code-distance “snap” to nearest 
valid value. 
